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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
but feels that "the Common Law will enter as a constituent element into a new
general law of those countries that have inherited European civilization and the
European economic structure."
RiCHARD B. MoRRis.*
CASES oN EQuITY. By Henry L. McClintock. St. Paul: West Publishing Co.,
1936, pp. v, 1286.
The right of equity to exist as a separate course has been challenged and
whether or not it will retain its place as a traditional course in law school
curricula remains a moot question.' The arrival of the functional approach,
causing in some places the rebuilding of the curricula, necessarily required the
preparation of new materials to meet the demands of analytical realism. The
experimental stage has probably been passed, and a new teaching technique can
he said to have "reached its majority".2 As to whether the movement has spent
its force, or whether it will sweep on and, with the aid of code developments,
merge equity into specialized contents, is in doubt. Present trends seem to
favor a status quo. Suffice to say that in a great majority of the citadels of
legal learning, the separate course of equity still holds its place on the ramparts.
Accordingly, the announcement that a new book is being prepared by a
well-known teacher arouses an interest similar to that of an automobile owner
awaiting new models. The book can hardly be said to have been prepared in
the tradition of Langdell and Ames, nor, on the other hand, can it be said to
have blazed a new trail in a free-lance adventure into the fields of functionalism.
The book contains four hundred and fifty-seven cases from forty-eight juris-
dictions. Interspersed between the cases are excerpts from statutes, problems,
and textual notes. The textual material is not found in such generous profusion
as in the books by Chafee, Cook, or Durfee. In fact, the author states that
"when the required number of cases, properly edited, is put into the course,
there is very little room for anything else".2 Many of the cases, old and recent,
are those found in other well-known equity texts. For instance, over seventy
of these cases are set forth as the principal cases in Chafee and Simpson. On
the other hand, the.author has selected much case material not found in other
books and has also selected short, significant cases. The longer ones are care-
fully and sometimes drastically edited, making an interesting ensemble.4 It is
* Assistant Professor of History, College of the City of New York.
'See Patterson, The Place of Equity i; the Law School Curriculum (1936)
8 Am. L. SCHOOL REv. 385.See Sayre, Book Review (1936) 24 CALiF. L. REv. 363.
3 P. vi.
'For example, Kempson v. Kempson, 58 N. J. Equity Rep. 94 (1899),
with the several opinions involved, is given 7 pages in Chafee and Simpson.
McClintock allows 31/2 pages to this case. To Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G.
M. & G. 607 (1852) McClintock allows 5 pages; Chafee and Simpson, 17
pages; Cook, 9 pages. To Young v. Guy, 87 N. Y. 457 (1882) McClintock
gives a little over 2 pages; Chafee and Simpson, together with extensive notes
and problems based on Young v. Guy, use 12 pages.
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to be seen then, that the concern of the teacher and reviewer is with two things:
one, the limitations that the author has placed upon his course, and two, the
arrangement of his material as significant of his approach and purpose.
The analysis and classification of the material, as indicated by the table of
contents, show that the author prepared the book with a definite purpose. The
volume is divided into two parts. Part I contains in Chapter I, material, as
usual, on the origin and history of equity, in brief form, and Chapter II, which
is longer, on the Nature of Equitable Relief. Part II, under the title, General
Scope of Equity, contains chapters on jurisdiction, inadequacy of legal remedy,
incidental legal relief, multiplicity, prevention and relief because of defective
common-law procedure. His purpose here is to acquaint the student with the
underlying principles of jurisdiction, procedure, and powers, so that "he can
more readily and more rapidly grasp their application to the particular problems
later considered".
Book Two is accordingly divided into Part I, Contracts; Part II, Property;
Part III, Personal Interests; Part IV, Public Interests. The plan further
indicates, at least to this reviewer, that Professor McClintock desires, in Part I,
to portray equity as an administrative process; and in Part II to bring out how
those principles are applied to particular problems within the limitation of the
usual course of equity.
An examination of the content shows that the author is well acquainted
with the problems of equity both as a matter of procedure and substance. The
inclusion of material on the fusion of law and equity in Book One, Part I, and
relief against contracts induced by fraud or mistake, and reformation of instru-
ments, after specific performance in Book Two, is logical and desirable. The
author evidently intends the book to be the basis of a separate course in equity.
His material on the fusion of law and equity is sufficient to present the general
problems of procedure involved in code states, but we wish he had given us
more text material to clarify such problems as are involved in "the one form
of action" and the right to trial by jury in cases involving conflicting claims of
fee simple title in land.6 Whether the difficult problems of equitable conversion
should come before tort prevention, is questionable, but certainly the separate
treatment of public interests is commendable.
In making the criticism that the book is made up largely of case material,
it should be stated that there are many footnotes throughout the work. They
are inserted to furnish additional citations or to explain the cases but they
cannot be said to be provocative or challenging. Law Review references are
frequently found in the footnotes; these references the author has arranged in
a special table in the front of the book. It should also be added that the
author's text on equity, published simultaneously with the cases, contains excel-
lent material, clearly written and carefully arranged, to be used with the
case book.
The author's position that "it is a waste of time and effort to attempt to
develop the meaning of the equitable doctrines of discretion in the administration
P. v.6 Cf. excellent note in DURFEE, CASES ON EQUITY (1928) What is the Effect
of Codes of Procedure on the Doctrine Requiring Trial at Law of Question
of Right?, pp. 453-454.
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of relief, adequacy of the remedy at law, and similar ones, in each seliarate
course where those doctrines may be applicable",7 is sound,-nor do we find any
pedagogical objection to developing the general doctrines of equity first, in the
manner set forth herein, on the basis that there will be some duplication of the
problems in the advance work. On the contrary, specific performance and
injunction against tort, etc., should be better understood and more successfully
taught, if the material in Book One is first studied and mastered. The material
under Equitable Ownership Arising from Contract, Equitable Liens, and Equi-
table Servitudes, Book Two, Part II, Chapters 1, 2 and 3, is usually included
under the title, Vendor and Purchaser. Of course, there is no such exhaustive
treatment as there is in Handler's "Vendor and Purchaser," which is used as
the basis of a separate course, dealing with the sale of land, but the material
that is given is nevertheless valuable, and if thoroughly mastered, the students
should know a great deal about the problems.
It has been urged that because lawyers do not specialize in equity we
should not hesitate to break it up and place its contents in specialized courses,-
and that the historical treatment should be left to a separate course in the
history of legal institutions.8 In contrast to this view, the principles of equity
so completely pervade the subject matter of many branches of organic law as
to render this method, perhaps, inappropriate, and to require the treatment of
equity as a separate course. Many of the permanent problems of equity can
only be explained by a knowledge of their history, such as the requirement of
the property right in cases of personal interests, the development of the law of
assignment of choses in action, and the development of the power of the court
of equity to act in rem. This book seems to take a middle ground. Book One
is quite in accord with the plan or method of Cook, also adopted to some extent
by Chafee and Simpson, but throughout the work the author achieves the result
of the second method by usually introducing each topic under consideration
with ancient English cases (and some old American ones for that matter) and
by following them with late cases to show the modern rules and how they are
applied. Such familiar land-marks as Bromage v. Genning I and Cokayn v.
Hurst "1 appear (but J. R. v. M. P. is out) .' The cases are arranged in a sort
of background-foreground order, in carefully selected quotas to fill in the topics
set forth in the table of contents, with an evident desire to avoid over-emphasis.
The material upon quieting title shows a careful selection of cases to present
various views of the problems involved, such as cases distinguishing the general
rule that equity will not interfere to remove a cloud on title where the instru-
ment constituting an alleged cloud is void because defects appear on its face.
The problem of whether a property right must be found as a condition to
granting equitable relief in cases of personal interest, which is adequately
7 P. v.
' See Patterson, The Place of Equity in the Law School Curriculum (1936)
8 Am. L. SCHOOL Rnv. 386.
" Brommage v. Genning, 1 Rolle 368, 81 Eng. Reprint 540 (K. B. 1616).10 Cokayn v. Hurst, Chancery, 1458. Select Cases in Chancery, 10 Selden
Society Publications, No. 142.
n J. R. v. M. P., Common Bench, 1459. Year Book, 37 Henry IV, folio 13,
placitum 3.
I P. 1173,--Maloney v. Finnegan, 38 Minn. 70, 35 N. W. 723 (1887).
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treated in sLxty-four pages in Part One of Cook's Cases, is confined to thirty
pages near the end of Book Two of McClintock's volume. The development of
equity's power to act in rem is not as full and complete as that in Chafee and
Simpson, and the omission of material on the doctrine of [is pendens, writs of
assistance, and sequestration, is noticeable. The extra-territorial effect of a
decree receives scant treatment, probably due to the author's belief that these
difficult problems belong to a course in Constitutional Law or Conflict of Laws.
Enough has been said to show that the book has been built by a master
craftsman. Teachers will welcome this volume. To fall into the triteness of
book reviews, the true test of the work is in its class use. The case material,
together with the excellent text mentioned before, should answer the problems
of many teachers of equity.
JOHN P. MALONEY.*
THE SAIm OF FOOD AND DRINK AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM
SALES AcT. By Harry C. W. Melick.' New York: Prentice Hall, Inc.,
1936, pp. xlii, 346.
How has it come to pass that most modern courts have made it so difficult
for the consumer of defective food or drink to recover damages from the
manufacturer or restaurateur, by refusing to imply a warranty unless there is a
sale and privity of contract between them, thus compelling the injured consumer
to resort to a tort action in which the burden of proving negligence is onerous,
if not impossible, to sustain? In his quest for the answer the author delves
into the hoary past and leads out from their tombs in the archives, two ancient
and moribund statutes' enacted in the reigns of Henry III and Edward I,
respectively, under which taverners, victuallers and other common dispensers
were liable to punishment for selling corrupt victuals, -wine and beer. These
statutes, it appears, were not repealed until the time of Queen Victoria. But
for a long time after their enactment they had a profound influence in establish-
ing, in civil actions for damages, this doctrine: that since the sale of unwhole-
some food and drink was an offense against public health, there was a duty
arising, not from contract, but from the trade and calling, to sell wholesome
stuff,-and a corresponding right in everyone who partook of it, whether as
donee, guest, or purchaser, to have that duty performed. Therefore, in offering
to sell food and drink at sound prices, victuallers impliedly represented that they
were complying with the public law. Hence, any consumer made ill by injurious
stuff was permitted to sue the maker or dispenser in an action on the case for
" See in a short note, p. 140, the author's reference to the leading Law
Review articles and to a number of the important cases covering this subject.
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
'Member of the New York Bar.
2 Statute, 51 Hen. III (1226); Statute, De PistoHbus et Brasiatoribus et
aliis Vitellariis (between 1272 and 1307) ; Statute, 12 Car. II c. 25 (1660) ; and
1 Statutes of the Realm p. 204, entitled De Venditione Farnue.
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